This paper analyses the optimal type and degree of commitment to a future climate policy when damage costs from climate change are uncertain. Taking uncertainty into account, it is shown within the framework of a sequential game between firms and a regulator that commitment to an emission abatement target fails to achieve the first best optimal outcome. Though commitment to a future policy reduces the risk of time-inconsistency, it imposes costs in the form of reduced flexibility to respond to new information. If, however, the regulator commits to an adjustment rule that sets the abatement level contingent on the realization of the uncertain parameter, the first best optimal outcome can be obtained.
Introduction

2
Emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to climate change. Regulators, by putting a 3 price on such emissions, can encourage firms to invest in the development and 4 deployment of technologies that reduce emissions and thereby climate change. Firms 5 may, however, doubt the stability of that policy over time if the regulator is perceived to 6 have an ex-post incentive to renege on a policy that was optimal ex-ante; a 7 phenomenon known as 'time-inconsistency' (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Helm et al. 8 2003) . A lack of confidence in the future stability of a policy reduces the effectiveness of 9 that policy today. The perceived risk of policy change increases the cost of achieving any 10 given level of emissions abatement. 11
12
The question of how to make climate policy more stable and credible figures 13 prominently in discussions surrounding the reform of the EU emission trading scheme 14 trade-off, often unmentioned and unresolved, that is fundamental for the design of 19 long-term policies: while on the one hand policy makers aim to establish credible carbon 20 price signals to investors and innovators, they also seek flexibility in order to be able to 21 react to unforeseen developments in the market, politics, and science (Brunner et al. 22 2012) . 23
24
One important source of uncertainty that policy makers seek to address in climate policy 25 concerns the cost of climate change which is a composite of many uncertain parameters 26 including climate sensitivity, regional impacts, and economic growth. Consider for 27 instance climate sensitivity: a doubling of the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 28 atmosphere would likely increase the global mean surface temperature between 1.5°C 29 and 4°C according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2013) . This 30 range is fairly broad and newer evidence suggests that it is too low (Shiogama and 31 Ogura 2014). Uncertainty over climate sensitivity is amplified by uncertainties on how a 32 changing climate translates into actual impacts (such as draughts, sea-level rise or 33 tropical storms) and lack of knowledge how societies can adapt to them (Malik and 34 Smith 2012). For this reason, new knowledge on any of the above and other parameters 35 could in the future make it desirable to opt for either more or less stringent emission 36
reduction targets than what seems optimal from the current perspective. How can the 37 trade-off between flexibility and commitment in climate policy be mitigated? The 38 central insight conveyed by our analysis is that policy makers can reconcile this trade-off 39 by committing to a transparent rule that allows readjusting the abatement target 40 conditional on new information. 41
42
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sketches the theoretical 43 background behind time-inconsisteny in climate policy. Section 3 presents a 44
deterministic Stackelberg game to demonstrate how (i) time-inconsistency emerges if 45 firms move first, and (ii) the social optimum can be obtained if the regulator can commit 46 to a certain policy level. We then introduce a term into the regulator's objective 47 function that punishes deviations from announced policies to generalize the polar cases 48 of full commitment and no commitment and include settings with intermediate 49 commitment. Section 4 derives the optimal level of commitment under uncertainty and 50
shows that the first best outcome can only be achieved if the regulator commits to an 51 adjustment rule that sets the abatement level contingent on the realization of climate 52 change damage costs. Section 5 discusses policy design options of commitment devices 53 and adjustment rules. emissions abatement e that firms are required to provide.
• 197
198
As firms anticipate that lower marginal costs due to technological innovation will 199 prompt the regulator to adopt more stringent policy, they choose a level of technology 200 below the social optimum. In our model, this 'ratchet effect' (Weitzman, 1980) , which is 201 due to the regulator's flexibility to react to firms' choice of t, results in a time-202 inconsistent choice of the abatement target e. Between these polar cases lies a continuum of setups in which the regulator is punished 227 for deviations from the pre-announced policy.
• 228
229
With perfect foresight, it is clear that perfect regulatory commitment is the most 230 desirable option from a social perspective (under the assumptions of our model). by c -as well as technology costs k. This finding is in line with intuition: the optimal level 357 of commitment is the higher the higher the benefits of mitigation relative to costs, and 358 the lower uncertainty over benefits. One can expect that this relationship holds for a 359 broad class of models, independent of the specific functional form adopted for costs and 360 benefits. 361 362 363 8 We used Matlab's bounded minimization routine fminbnd. 9 Note that the optimal θ is always strictly positive.
[ Figure 2 about here] 364 365
First best solution 366
As shown by the example in Section 2, the first best outcome can be obtained by 367
simultaneously choosing e and t after observing the realization of e , such that the first- . As the first best optimum of Eq.(17) corresponds to the optimal choice of e' 384 and t (which maximizes expected welfare), Eq.(15) has to lie strictly below the level of 385 expected welfare implied by Eq.(17). Hence, Eq.(15) constitutes a second best but not a 386 first best optimum, i.e. it is only optimal under the precondition that the regulator's 387 choice is restricted to committing to a specific abatement level.
• 388
389
Commitment to an adjustment rule 390
Under uncertainty, there is no a-priori commitment to a specific * e that yields the first-391 best optimal outcome. However, instead of making a commitment to a pre-announced 392 policy the regulator could commit to an adjustment rule that sets subsidies that remove firms' incentives to under-invest with the aim to influence the 420 regulator to implement a less stringent abatement target can act as a substitute for a 421 commitment device, i.e. it can achieve the socially optimal outcome. This line of 422 reasoning also applies to our setting. In fact, if the subsidy is implemented after the 423 stochastic shock is resolved, our model is equivalent to Ulph and Ulph (2013) . their actions -even though they can exert discretion over the money supply -is well 516 described by a Taylor rule (Whitesell, 2011) . Hence, even an institutional setting relying 517 on discretion might help to approximate the rule-based framework outlined above. relevant parameters are known with certainty, a regulator can achieve the first-best 525 optimal outcome by committing to the ex-ante optimal emission target. However, under 526 uncertainty, new information may be revealed after the regulator's policy is put in place. 527
Uncertainty makes flexibility very valuable. Full commitment to an ex-ante optimal 528 target -which has been identified by previous literature as a remedy to time-529 inconsistency -leads to suboptimal results under uncertainty. We demonstrate that 530 under uncertainty, the first-best optimal outcome can still be achieved by means of a 531 transparent rule that allows adjustments of the policy level conditional on new 532 information. Commitment to such an adjustment rule can be established by means of 533 legislating a climate law that specifies the rule and adjustment procedures and 534
delegates implementation tasks to a politically independent agency. Legislation of 535 transparent procedures is particularly important because of the difficulty to impartially 536 evaluate and respond to new information on critical parameters such as climate 537 sensitivity and climate change damage costs. 538
539
While we have presented an argument in favor of adjustment-rule-based policy within a 540 stylized model that focuses on the uncertainty over climate change damage costs, the 541 underlying intuition appears to be relevant to a broader set of applications. In cases in 542 which there is uncertainty with regard to a parameter relevant to decision making that 543 can be observed ex-post, using adjustment rules as a basis of policy can help to mitigate 544 the trade-offs between commitment and flexibility. Such parameters could include not 545 only climate change damage costs but also other important values such as climate 546 sensitivity, sea level rise, economic growth, or even the emissions of other states. Given 547 the many uncertain factors and the need to encourage long-term thinking and 548 investment, adjustment rules could turn out to be an essential ingredient of prudent 549 climate policy. 550
